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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD:* 
HOW LEADERS IN FAITH-BASED SCHOOLS CAN 
FOLLOW THEIR BELIEFS IN HIRING 
Charles J. Russo** 
INTRODUCTION 
 confluence of litigation at the Supreme Court raises important, yet 
potentially conflicting, questions about the freedom of employers in 
religious schools1 to hire teachers and staff members.  On the one hand, in 
Hosanna-Tabor v. Equal Employment Opportunities Commission,2 a unanimous 
Court reasoned that the ministerial exception granted religious leaders alone the 
authority to choose who is qualified to teach in their schools.  On the other hand, 
the Court’s rulings on same sex-unions seem to be ushering in a brave new 
 
 * Consistent with the title of Aldous Huxely’s novel, which is based on Miranda’s speech in 
William Shakespeare The Tempest, Act V, scene I, available at http://shakespeare.mit.edu/ 
tempest/full.html (“How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world, ….”), Justice Scalia expressed 
a similar legal sentiment in Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 711 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (affirming that the First Amendment protects independent contractors from 
the termination of or prevention of automatic renewals of at-will government contracts in 
retaliation for exercising their right to freedom of speech) (“The Court must be living in another 
world.  Day by day, case by case, it is busy designing a Constitution for a country I do not 
recognize.”). 
 ** B.A., 1972, St. John’s University; M. Div., 1978, Seminary of the Immaculate Conception; 
J.D., 1983, St. John’s University; Ed.D., 1989, St. John’s University; Panzer Chair in Education, 
Director of the Ph.D. Program in Educational Leadership, and Adjunct Professor of Law, 
University of Dayton.  I would like to express my gratitude to my dear friends William E. Thro, 
M.A., J.D., General Counsel at the University of Kentucky, and Ralph D. Mawdsley, J.D., Ph.D., 
professor of Law and Roslyn Z. Wolf Endowed Chair in Education at Cleveland State University, 
for their useful comments on drafts of this article.  I would also like to thank my assistant, Ms. 
Elizabeth Pearn, at the University of Dayton for proof-reading the article and helping to prepare it 
for publication.  Thanks, too, to Ms. Stephanie Green (and all of her colleagues), Symposium 
Editor, for all of her gracious assistance with regard to this timely issue.  I offer my greatest thanks 
to my wife, Debbie Russo, a fellow educator, for proof-reading in addition to all else that she does 
for me in our life together. 
To view my video presentation for the University of Toledo Law Review’s Symposium 
entitled “From Kindergarten to College: Brainstorming Solutions to Modern Issues in Education 
Law,” see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I2tMkeiEEII.  
 1. This article uses the terms religious schools, religiously affiliated non-public schools, and 
faith-based schools interchangeably.  Further, in recognizing that a variety of faith-based schools 
exist, the article refers to Christian schools because all of the reported education-related litigation to 
date involving institutions operated by Christian denominations. 
 2. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 698 (2012). 
A
RUSSO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2014  11:30 AM 
458 UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
world.  For example, in United States v. Windsor,3 the Court struck down the 
Defense of Marriage Act thereby requiring the federal government to recognize 
unions that are legal in the States where they were entered.  Similarly, in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry,4 albeit a dispute about standing rather than the merits of 
the issue, the Justices refused to allow supporters of a voter-initiative from 
California which defined marriage as a relationship between one man and one 
woman, to defend it in judicial proceedings.  In this brave new world, there is 
possible conflict over whether leaders in faith-based schools can continue to 
exercise their professional judgments grounded in their deeply held religious 
beliefs when hiring personnel or whether proponents of change are unwilling to 
allow people of faith to live in a country where there is “space for other 
Americans who believe something different.”5 
Aware of the nascent tension that these and other cases may present for 
leaders in faith-based schools when it comes to hiring and personnel actions, 
especially at the K-12 level which is the focus of this article, this article is 
divided into three sections.  The first part reviews the key features of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,6 which affords leaders in faith-based schools 
latitude in making personnel decisions. 
The second section briefly reflects on the potential conflict between 
Hosanna Tabor, Hollingsworth, and Windsor, particularly if states refuse to grant 
exceptions to religious employers under their anti-discrimination statutes when 
dealing with the marital status and lifestyle choices of potential employees.  This 
discussion is framed against the explicit language in Hosanna Tabor, and the 
long history of religious freedom in the United States as reflected in the First 
Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise Clause,7 coupled with the Court’s 
rationale in Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society 
International (Alliance).8  In Alliance, the Court observed that the 
constitutionality of a condition on receiving a subsidy, or in terms more 
applicable to religious institutions such as schools, tax exemptions for themselves 
and tax deductions for donors depends on whether the condition imposed by the 
government defines or reaches outside of programs.  As such, employers in faith-
 
 3. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). 
 4. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2678 (2013), appeal dismissed sub nom. Perry v. 
Brown, 725 F.3d 1140, 1140 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 5. Ironically, in penning this phrase, a member of the Supreme Court of New Mexico agreed 
that a Christian photographer could be fined for refusing to offer her services at a same-sex 
commitment ceremony.  Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 78-79 (N.M. 2013) (Bosson, 
J., concurring).  Chillingly, in terms of religious freedom, a page earlier the concurrence suggested 
that the plaintiffs “are compelled by law to compromise the very religious beliefs that inspire their 
lives.…  A multicultural, pluralistic society, one of our nation’s strengths, demands no less.”  Id.  If 
the United States is to truly be pluralistic, why cannot people agree to have different value systems, 
respecting those with whom they differ?  Why is it that believers are expected to compromise their 
values? 
 6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-4 (2012). 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  According to the sixteen words of these clauses, “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof[.]”  Id. 
 8. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2013). 
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based schools should be able to preserve their right to hire as they deem 
appropriate. 
Based on analysis from the first two parts of this article, the final section 
offers recommendations for leaders in faith-based schools, and their lawyers, as 
they walk a tightrope by seeking to protect their religious autonomy while taking 
steps to avoid running afoul of anti-discrimination statutes in the brave new 
world that may be ushered in by such cases as Hollingsworth and Windsor.  The 
article rounds out with a brief conclusion. 
I.  TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
Title VII was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in response to 
the Civil Rights movement that followed the Supreme Court’s monumental 
judgment in Brown v. Board of Education.9  Accordingly, the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 codified many of the equal opportunities advances that emerged as a result 
of the Civil Rights Movement.10  
At the heart of the Civil Rights Act is Title VII, the most significant federal 
anti-discrimination statute dealing with employment.11  In its most relevant part, 
Title VII reads: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer: 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.12 
Title VII acknowledges the tension that may arise between the authority of 
ecclesiastical employers to retain control in their schools and the rights of 
employees to be free from workplace discrimination.  In this way, Title VII 
provides far-reaching protection to religious employers since it permits them to 
 
 9. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cnty., Ky., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) 
(invalidating racial segregation in public schools). 
 10. Janet S. Belcove-Shalin, Ministerial Exception and Title VII Claims: Case Law Grid 
Analysis, 2 NEV. L.J. 86, 90 (2002) (noting the crucial role played by ecclesiastical leaders in 
helping to counter a filibuster by southern (Democrat) Senators but describing the exception given 
to religious employers as an irony given Title VII’s anti-discrimination provisions, perhaps failing 
to take into account the quid pro quo nature of politics).  
 11. For histories of the ministerial exception, see Blair A. Crunk, Comment, New Wine in an 
Old Chalice: The Ministerial Exception’s Humble Roots, 73 LA. L. REV. 1081, 1082, 1088, 1090-
92, 1097-98, 1100-01 (2013); Joshua D. Dunlap, Comment, When Big Brother Plays God: The 
Religion Clauses, Title VII, and The Ministerial Exception, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2005, 2012 
(2007).  See also Belcove-Shalin, supra note 10, at 92, 95, 99, 100, 102, 103. 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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establish bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQs) while crafting policies 
designed to focus on hiring and retaining members of their faiths. 
As discussed below, judicial interpretation of Title VII recognizes that a 
distinction, one which may be applied very narrowly at times, can be made 
between the duties of ecclesiastical educational leaders who make hiring 
decisions based on religion and judgments where secular jobs and duties come 
into play.  Courts are, thus, generally unwilling to intervene in disputes over 
whether teachers witness to the faith in their public-professional lives such as 
when they are pregnant out of wedlock13 or adopt lifestyles that are antithetical to 
the teachings of their church employers.14  Still, courts are more willing to assert 
their jurisdiction over secular matters, including whether teachers in religious 
schools can engage in bargaining over the terms and conditions of their 
employment under state,15 but not federal,16 laws as well as whether they can file 
age discrimination claims.17 
Title VII has special rules for religious employers, such as faith-based 
schools.  In fact, Title VII provides significant protection to religious employers 
 
 13. For a commentary on point, see Jessica L. Waters, Testing Hosanna-Tabor: The 
Implications for Pregnancy Discrimination Claims and Employees’ Reproductive Rights, 9 STAN. J. 
C.R. & C.L. 47, 59-66 (2013). 
 14. For case upholding the dismissal of a teacher in a faith-based school who violated the 
precepts of her religious employer by openly living with her boyfriend and raising their child 
without being married on the ground that she was a “spiritual leader” for purposes of the ministerial 
exception, see Henry v. Red Hill Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tustin, 201 Cal. App. 4th 1041, 
1054-55 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 15. For cases mandating bargaining under state law, see Catholic High Sch. Ass’n of 
Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161, 1171 (2d Cir. 1985); Hill-Murray Fed’n of 
Teachers, St. Paul, Minn. v. Hill-Murray High Sch., Maplewood, Minn., 487 N.W.2d 857, 867 
(Minn. 1992); South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers Org. v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus Church 
Elementary Sch., 696 A.2d 709, 724 (N.J. 1997).  But see Cent. Catholic Educ. Ass’n v. 
Archdiocese of Portland, 916 P.2d 303, 310 (Or. 1996) (refusing to apply a state, rather than 
federal, law over whether the State Educational Labor Relations Board could resolve a dispute 
about certifying a bargaining representative for teachers in a high school owned and operated by a 
Catholic archdiocese). 
 16. For cases in K-12 settings where the judiciary refused to permit federal law to compel 
bargaining in Catholic schools, see NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 506 (1979).  
For a commentary on this case, see Charles J. Russo, NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago: 
Collective Bargaining in Roman Catholic Secondary Schools Ten Years Later, 57 EDUC. L. 
REP.1113, 1117-18 (1990).  See also N.L.R.B. v. Bishop Ford Cent. Catholic High Sch., 623 F.2d 
818, 822 (2d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 996 (1981).  For a case in higher education, see 
Carroll College, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 558 F.3d 568, 574 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 17. For cases on point, see DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 168 (2d Cir. 1993); 
Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 42 F. Supp. 2d 849, 851 (S.D. Ind. 1998); 
Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 
881 (2006).  But see Coulee Catholic Schs. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 768 N.W.2d 868, 
892 (Wis. 2009) (holding that age’s discrimination claim impinges upon the employer’s right to 
religious freedom and reversing the court of appeals decision).  See also Corp. of Presiding Bishop 
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the ministerial exception).  For a commentary on this case, see generally Brigid 
C. O’Neill, Freedom of Religion—Extending the Ministerial Exception Too Far Allows Religious 
Organizations to Discriminate Against Their Employees: Coulee Catholic Schs. v. Labor & Indus. 
Review Comm’n, 768 N.W.2d 868 (Wis. 2009), 41 RUTGERS L.J. 1121 (2010). 
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since it permits their officials to set BFOQs relating to religion while allowing 
them to limit hiring to members of their faiths. 
The four exemptions under Title VII have a major impact on personnel 
matters in faith-based schools since they shield institutional officials from 
charges of religious discrimination.  These exemptions apply to institutions with 
fifteen or more employees, BFOQs, individuals who serve in ministerial 
capacities, and institutions that are in whole or in substantial part, owned, 
supported, controlled, or managed by religious bodies. 
First, the threshold exemption under Title VII applies to institutions with 
fifteen or more employees.18  Accordingly, Title VII has a limited impact in small 
schools since these institutions are typically considered part of the larger 
religious organizations, such as the parishes, with which they are affiliated. 
The second, and arguably most important, exemption applies “where 
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or 
enterprise.”19  In such a case, the Sixth Circuit addressed the nonrenewal of the 
contract of a teacher in a Roman Catholic elementary school who gave birth six 
months after getting married.20  While pointing to language in the teacher’s 
contract “that by word and example you will reflect the values of the Catholic 
Church[,]”21 the court refused to uphold a grant of summary judgment in favor of 
the diocese.  The panel returned the dispute to a trial court for further 
consideration since it was uncertain whether the teacher’s contract was not 
renewed solely due to her pregnancy.22  Conversely, the same Sixth Circuit 
upheld the dismissal of a suit filed by a former preschool teacher who alleged 
that she was fired for being pregnant.23  The court affirmed that officials in a 
Christian school did not violate Title VII since the former teacher was unable to 
show that they applied the policy against premarital sex in a discriminatory 
manner.24 
 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012). 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(e)(1) (2012). 
 20. Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 656 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  For other cases denying motions for summary judgment entered on behalf of officials 
in faith-based schools in dispute over whether the contracts of unmarried teachers were terminated 
due to their pregnancies, see Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 359 (E.D.N.Y. 
1998); Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 566 F. Supp. 2d 125, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 
2008).  For an unreported case involving a similar issue where the court rejected a motion to 
dismiss by school officials in the face of the claim of an unmarried teacher who was impregnated 
via artificial insemination, a practice forbidden by the Catholic Church, see Dias v. Archdiocese of 
Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2012 WL 1068165, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012).  See also 
Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, No. 1:12-CV-122RM, 2012 WL 3870528, at *1 (N.D. 
Ind. Sept. 05, 2012) (affirming an order staying discovery where the contract of a teacher was not 
renewed because she was undergoing in vitro fertilization treatments, another practice forbidden by 
Catholic teachings).  For the facts, see the pleadings at Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, 
Inc., No.1:12CV122RLM, 2012 WL 1416923, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 05, 2012). 
 23. Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 410 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 24. Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1316 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(reversing an earlier grant of summary judgment in favor of officials in religious school in Florida 
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A closely related third exemption, which is derived from the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment, applies “to a religious corporation, association, 
educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals 
of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such 
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”25 
Typically referred to as the ministerial26 or McClure exception,27 this forbids 
secular authorities from interfering in employment disputes between ministers 
and their churches.  This provision placed the burden of proof of the necessity of 
BFOQs on employers, even if individuals are not ordained clerics.28  In order to 
apply this exception, authorities in religious institutions must prove that the 
nexus between teaching and/or other duties of staff members are so integrally 
related to furthering their spiritual and pastoral missions that they can be treated 
as ministerial employees.29 
In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,30 the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the ministerial exception.  Amos involved a 
building engineer who filed a class action suit when he was dismissed after 
sixteen years of employment at a gymnasium operated by the Church of Jesus 
Christ of the Latter Day Saints.31  The plaintiff was fired because he was unable 
to qualify for a certificate that enabled him to attend one of the Church’s 
Temples.32  The Court found that the plaintiff was fired even though he did not 
perform religious duties.  However, Title VII did not violate the Establishment 
Clause because earlier language, referring to an institution’s “religious 
activities,” was no longer in the law.33  The upshot of Amos is that the Court 
extended the reach of the ministerial exception to non-religious employment-
related activities. 
 
where issues of fact issues existed as to whether a teacher was fired for being pregnant or for 
engaging in premarital sexual relations). 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2012). 
 26. The ministerial exception was first enunciated in McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 
553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972) (affirming that Title VII precluded 
judicial intervention in a dispute over gender-based discrimination between a “church and its 
minister” where a female officer completed years of professional training).  
 27. See EEOC v. Pacific Press Pub’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1279 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 28. The exception has generated an extensive body of literature.  For representative recent 
commentary, see, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 839, 848-52 (2012); Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial 
Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (2011); Todd Cole, Comment, The Ministerial Exception: 
Resolving the Conflict Between Title VII and the First Amendment, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 703, 
704-06 (2010); Janet S. Belcove-Shalin, Ministerial Exception and Title VII Claims: Case Law 
Grid Analysis, 2 NEV. L.J. 86, 99-105 (2002). 
 29. For a pre-Hosanna-Tabor analysis of this issue, see generally Note, The Ministerial 
Exception to Title VII: The Case for a Deferential Primary Duties Test, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1776 
(2008). 
 30. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327, 327 (1987). 
 31. Id. at 330-31. 
 32. Id. at 330. 
 33. Id. at 335-36. 
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When a first-grade teacher in a Roman Catholic school was dismissed as a 
result of consolidations, she filed suit and claimed that she was subjected to age 
discrimination.34  Reversing an earlier order, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
noted that the teacher was hired to help advance the school’s religious mission in 
a faith-centered environment that incorporated Catholic values, doctrine, and 
practice.  She was also tasked with encouraging spiritual growth in children 
throughout the school day, not just in religion class, and was obligated to obtain 
certifications in religious instruction.35  Convinced that the teacher was covered 
by the ministerial exception, the court concluded that she could not adjudicate 
her age discrimination claim.36 
In its most important case for hiring in faith-based schools, the Supreme 
Court, in a rare unanimous judgment in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (Hosanna-
Tabor),37 upheld the constitutionality of the ministerial exception, albeit as it was 
extended under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)38 rather than Title 
VII.  In so ruling, the Court rejected an order of the EEOC directing officials at a 
Lutheran elementary school to re-employ a female teacher who was dismissed 
due to an illness and for disruptively influencing the staff.39 
At issue in Hosanna-Tabor was whether school officials could dismiss a 
contract teacher who they regarded as “called,” meaning she had a vocation from 
God.40  Since the Justices viewed the teacher as essentially a ministerial 
employee, the Supreme Court agreed that educational officials had freedom in 
the interplay between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses to safeguard 
the school’s religious liberty in selecting teachers qua ministers.41 
 
 34. Coulee Catholic Sch. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 768 N.W.2d 868, 868 (Wis. 
2009). 
 35. Id. at 890. 
 36. O’Neill, supra note 17, at 1122. 
 37. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 694 (2012). 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).  Specifically, § 12113(d)(1) states: 
(d) Religious entities. 
(1) In general.  This title shall not prohibit a religious corporation, association, educational 
institution, or society from giving preference in employment to individuals of a particular 
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, 
educational institution, or society of its activities.  
(2) Religious tenets requirement.  Under this title, a religious organization may require that 
all applicants and employees conform to the religious tenets of such organization.  
42 U.S.C. § 12113(d)(1) (2012). 
 39. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710. 
 40. Id. at 699. 
 41. For a commentary on point, see generally Lauren N. Woleslagle, Comment, The United 
States Supreme Court Sanctifies the Ministerial Exception in Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC Without 
Addressing Who Is a Minister: A Blessing for Religious Freedom or is the Line Between Church 
and State Still Blurred?, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 895 (2012). 
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Reversing the Sixth Circuit,42 the Supreme Court decided that the teacher’s 
allegation, that her primary duties were secular notwithstanding the ministerial 
exception, precluded her ADA claim.43  The Court rejected the teacher’s claim 
that she was dismissed in retaliation for threatening to take legal action when she 
refused to resign in a dispute over whether she could return to work due to her 
health problems.44 
Emphasizing the First Amendment prohibition against government 
contravention of the judgment of church leaders as to who can serve as ministers, 
the Supreme Court explained that the ministerial exception applied to bar the 
teacher’s claim.  The Court reached this outcome even though the teacher spent 
more than six hours of her seven-hour day teaching secular subjects,45 used 
secular textbooks that did not mention religion,46 teachers were not required to be 
“called” or members of the Lutheran faith to conduct religious activities,47 and 
the duties of contract teachers were identical to non-ministers.48  In other words, 
the Court protected the school’s religious freedom by agreeing that ecclesiastical 
leaders and officials of faith-based institutions, rather than civil authorities such 
as the EEOC, retain the freedom to apply their religious values in making hiring 
decisions as to who can serve or be ministers. 
On the same day that it handed down Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court 
rejected two other challenges involving the ministerial exception.  In the first, the 
Director of the Department of Religious Formation unsuccessfully sued the 
Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, Oklahoma, for gender and age discrimination after 
being dismissed from her job.49  In the second, the Justices declined to hear the 
appeal where a Director of Religious Education, who also taught mathematics, 
sued the Catholic Diocese of Lansing, Michigan, for alleged violations of the 
state’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act and Civil Rights Act for retaliatory 
dismissal over charges unrelated to her duties as a religious educator.50  The 
Court posited that the plaintiffs could not proceed with their suits because they 
were subject to the ministerial exception.51 
 
 42. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 782 (6th Cir. 
2010). 
 43. Hosana-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710. 
 44. Id. at 707. 
 45. Id. at 708. 
 46. EEOC, 597 F.3d at 772. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1240 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 50. Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 756 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008). 
 51. For a story about a state trial court judge in New York’s refusal to apply the ministerial 
exception, see Howard Friedman, Ministerial Exception Defense Rejected in Suit by Transgender 
Catholic School Teacher, RELIGION CLAUSE, Sept. 10, 2013, 2013 WLNR 22520726 (reporting on 
the rejection of the ministerial exception defense raised by officials in a Catholic high school in a 
suit by a former teacher with 32 years of experience who claimed to have been fired for announcing 
that she is transgendered; administrators countered that the teacher was dismissed for 
insubordination). 
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The final exemption, which applies to institutions that are “in whole or in 
substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular 
religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the 
curriculum of such school, college, university, or other educational institution … 
is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion,”52 permits hiring 
preferences for members of their faiths.  In such a case, albeit from higher 
education, the Eleventh Circuit permitted officials at a Baptist university to limit 
a faculty member’s teaching assignments to undergraduate classes while 
preventing him from teaching in its divinity school due to religious differences 
between him and the dean.53  The court added that even though the university 
was no longer under the direct control of a religious governing body, it was 
entitled to the exemption because the church was still a substantial supporter.54 
In a related type of dispute not involving Title VII, the Third Circuit upheld 
the authority of educational officials to supervise faculty behavior at a Catholic 
school.  The court affirmed that officials did not violate the rights of a faculty 
member who taught English and religion to seventh and eighth grade students 
when they terminated her employment because she signed an advertisement in a 
newspaper in support of the Supreme Court’s legalization of abortion despite her 
knowledge that this position contradicted Church teachings.55  In deferring to the 
authority of school officials to ensure doctrinal compliance, the court pointed out 
that insofar as the teacher was not engaged in protected free speech activity when 
she signed the newspaper advertisement, she failed to present a viable claim for 
retribution.56  The court maintained that officials proffered a valid justification 
for dismissing the teacher since she knowingly violated Church teaching.57 
II.  REFLECTIONS 
As important as granting deference to ecclesiastical officials who apply the 
teachings of their faiths has been in the United States, a trend in litigation may 
increase the rate at which challenges are filed to religious freedom, Title VII, and 
the Free Exercise Clause.  For instance, in United States v. Windsor,58 some of 
Justice Kennedy’s musings as author of the Supreme Court’s majority’s opinion 
 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-(e)(2)(e) (2012). 
 53. Killinger v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 200-01 (11th Cir. 1997).  See also Hall v. 
Baptist Mem’l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 627 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming the dismissal of a 
student services specialist, an ordained lay minister, in a church with a large gay and lesbian 
membership); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F. 3d 294, 311 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming that the 
ministerial exception precluded the Title VII gender discrimination claim of a former chaplain at a 
Catholic college but did not prevent her from pursuing other allegations including fraudulent 
misrepresentation and breach of contract).  
 54. Killinger, 113 F.3d at 201. 
 55. Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 138-40 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
 56. Id. at 142. 
 57. Id. at 140. 
 58. See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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in a five-to-four order invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act59 should warn 
religious leaders about the status of the Free Exercise Clause. 
According to Justice Kennedy’s inflammatory rhetoric, “[i]n determining 
whether a law is motived by an improper animus or purpose, ‘[d]iscriminations 
of an unusual character’ … require careful consideration.”60  Justice Scalia took 
strong exception to part of Justice Kennedy’s unnecessarily provocative and 
condescending perspective in which the latter wrote “that the supporters of this 
Act acted with malice—with the ‘purpose’ ‘to disparage and to injure’ same-sex 
couples.”61  It is unclear how or why Kennedy could make such a sweeping and 
ultimately mean-spirited statement absent evidence.  On the same day, in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry,62 the Court invalidated the voter-enacted Proposition 8, a 
state constitutional amendment that defined marriage as one between a man and a 
woman. because proponents lacked standing to sue. 
Readily conceding that an analysis of same-sex unions is beyond the scope 
of this article, proponents on both sides of the issue should demonstrate mutual 
respect.  Moreover, supporters of same-sex unions, such as Justice Kennedy, 
should not impute a discriminatory animus to those who disagree with his point 
of view, especially when differences emerge in light of individuals’ sincerely 
held religious beliefs.  If anything, insofar as Kennedy’s position can lead to dire 
consequences for religious freedom, particularly faith-based schools as officials 
seek to hire teachers who will preserve institutional values. 
In light of Windsor, it is worth considering its potential impact on 
mainstream religious bodies and their schools that do not support same-sex 
unions.  Further questions from critics of the ministerial exception63 arise about 
the treatment of religious bodies that refuse to ordain non-celibate gays (or 
women, an admittedly different topic) as members of their clergy.64  Put another 
way, subject to the discussion in the next paragraph, it remains to be seen 
 
 59. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1948). 
 60. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (internal citations omitted). 
 61. Justice Scalia’s response added that the Court “says that the motivation for DOMA was to 
demean;” to “impose inequality;” to “impose ... a stigma;” to deny people “equal dignity;” to brand 
gay people as “unworthy;” and to “humiliat[e].”  Id. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal 
citations and emphasis omitted).  Of course, he disagreed.  Id. 
 61. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2652 (2013), appeal dismissed sub nom., Perry v. 
Brown, 725 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 62. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2652. 
 63. For an article arguing that the ministerial exception has no place in the Supreme Court’s 
contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence, see Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The 
Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exception from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1966, 1966-67 (2007).  See also Ashlie C. Warnick, Accommodating Discrimination, 77 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 119, 128 (2008); Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the 
Public Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1114; Laura L. Coon, Employment Discrimination by 
Religious Institutions: Limiting the Sanctuary of the Constitutional Ministerial Exception to 
Religion-Based Employment Decisions, 54 VAND. L. REV. 481, 484-86 (2001). 
 64. For a note examining this question, see generally Jessica R. Vartanian, Comment, 
Confessions of the Church: Discriminatory Practices by Religious Employers and Justifications for 
a More Narrow Ministerial Exception, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 1049 (2009). 
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whether religious institutions will be required to modify their hiring practices 
based on sexuality and lifestyle preferences. 
Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society 
International65 may offer an answer to the Windsor conundrum.  In Alliance, the 
Supreme Court held that the constitutionality of a condition for receiving a 
subsidy, or in terms more applicable to religious institutions such as schools and 
houses of worship, tax exemptions for themselves and tax deductions for donors, 
depends on whether the condition imposed by the government define or reaches 
outside of programs.66  In other words, it appears that pursuant to Alliance, public 
officials cannot impose requirements on religious organizations that would 
change their very nature.  For example, expecting them to alter their doctrines or 
moral teachings about marriage since these go to the heart of their sincerely held 
religious beliefs.67  Of course, it is unclear whether Alliance can be applied to 
protect religious organizations such as schools in the attacked by opponents of 
religious freedom who seek to use the police power of the State to punish those 
who disagree with their positions on such controversial topics as same-sex 
unions, abortion,68 or the health care mandate.69  
III.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Hosanna Tabor appears to preclude governmental officials from using their 
authority to force religious employers to hire individuals whose lifestyles and/ or 
beliefs are openly inconsistent with, or hostile to, the teachings of their churches. 
Further, Alliance seems to resolve the question of whether states can withhold tax 
exempt status from religious bodies such as schools that refuse to accept same-
sex unions. 
In enacting statutory protections against employment discrimination in Title 
VII, Congress weighed two potentially conflicting sets of interests.  On the one 
hand, Congress balanced the needs of religious leaders to retain control over 
hiring personnel consistent with their duty to comply with the precepts of their 
faiths against the rights of individuals to be free from discrimination as they seek 
gainful employment.  Consequently, Title VII is designed to ensure that 
administrators in faith-based schools should not have to compromise their beliefs 
when hiring staff.70 
Leaders in religiously affiliated non-public schools and their attorneys may 
wish to consider the following suggestions designed to preserve their right to hire 
 
 65. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2321 (2013).  
 66. Id. at 2332. 
 67. For a much more detailed analysis of Alliance, see generally William E. Thro, 
Undermining Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 295 EDUC. L. REP. 867 (2013). 
 68. See In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1023-31 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(holding that a pro-abortion group lacked standing to challenge the tax exempt status of the Roman 
Catholic Church based on its pro-life teachings). 
 69. For a discussion of some of these issues, see Charles J. Russo, Religious Freedom in the 
United States: “When You Come to the Fork in the Road Take It,” 38 U. DAYTON. L. REV. 363 
(2013). 
 70. See supra note 5 for a discussion about compromising values.  
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individuals whose lifestyles and values are consistent with their faiths.  Of 
course, in developing and implementing hiring and personnel policies, leaders in 
faith-based schools should give witness to the spirit of Christian justice and 
Gospel values in making hiring decisions.71 
In the first of two related initial items, educational leaders, whether at the 
diocesan level in Catholic institutions, the most highly bureaucratic and 
centralized systems of faith-based schools, or in independent Christian or other 
types of religious schools, should provide regular professional development 
opportunities for both administrators and teachers.72  Doing so can help to 
familiarize educators with the dimensions of the relationship between their faith 
traditions and civil law.  Offering professional development opportunities on the 
interplay between religious teachings and secular laws in faith-based schools can 
provide a solid background to enhance policy development that meets the 
requirements of both legal systems. 
Second, in an overlapping concern, religious leaders should work with 
teacher and administrator preparation programs at institutions of higher learning 
so that the latter can include units or courses on relationship between church 
teachings and civil law.  Encouraging educators in preparation programs to offer 
such classes should allow administrators and teachers to understand the 
relationship between these two overlapping sets of legal obligations.  As 
highlighted in the ensuing suggestions, adopting a proactive approach should 
help in developing hiring and personnel policies since administrators and 
teachers ought to have acquired better understandings of applicable legal 
requirements under both church and civil law. 
Third, when leaders in faith-based schools, working with their attorneys, 
prepare job descriptions and hiring policies, they should follow judicial guidance 
in distinguishing between ministerial and secular duties.  For example, it is a 
good idea to differentiate between teaching religion and issues that are purely 
secular as opposed to salary and benefits that can be subject to collective 
bargaining.73  In delineating between religious and lay aspects of work, policies 
should enunciate BFOQs clearly and unequivocally differentiating hiring criteria 
and job qualifications plus rationales as to why they are put in place.  In creating 
BFOQs for jobs in which religion is an essential work requirement such as 
teaching theology or serving as a music minister74 or serving in a faith 
formation75 capacity, officials should make it clear in posting vacancies and 
 
 71. For a case where the shoe was on the proverbial other foot insofar as it involved an 
administrator, see Dayner v. Archdioceses of Hartford, 23 A.3d 1192, 1210 (Conn. 2011) (holding 
that the ministerial exception barred a former principal’s breach of contract and other claims).  
 72. For Roman Catholic schools, it is important to review the extensive directives in the CODE 
OF CANON LAW 796-805 (1983), http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/__P2N.HTM. 
 73. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. 
 74. See, e.g., Prince of Peace Lutheran Church v. Linklater, 28 A.3d 1171, 1174, 1181 (Md. 
2011) (holding that the ministerial exception precluded most, but not all, of a former music 
minister’s sex discrimination claims). 
 75. See DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878, 882 (Wis. 2012) (holding that 
federal and state law barred the breach of contract claim of a Director of a Faith Formation 
Program in a Catholic parish since she was a ministerial employee). 
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hiring policies that one’s faith is to be taken into consideration.  Officials should 
also specify that they apply these policies consistently. 
Fourth, to build on the previous point, religious employers should 
remember that if they wish to include church teachings on matters such as pre-
marital sexual relations and pregnancy,76 marriage to individuals who are 
divorced,77 or sexual orientation78 in personnel policies and job postings, they 
should do so explicitly, making it clear exactly what behavior is proscribed.  One 
way to help avoid confusion is to use incorporation by reference, citing the 
appropriate Church documents, and giving prospective teachers and staff 
members copies of these materials with their contracts.  Illustrative policy 
language, at least for a Catholic school, might read that “all employees are 
expected to familiarize themselves with the Church’s teachings on sexuality as 
contained in The Catechism of the Catholic Church, a copy of which they 
acknowledged being given when they signed their employment contracts” rather 
than using such broad language as “employees must abide by Gospel values.” 
Moreover, contract language should encourage teachers to check with 
educational leaders, who should respond if writing to document conversations, if 
they have questions about Church teachings. 
Personal matters involving personnel can become thorny because, as the 
litigation discussed earlier suggests, courts tend to defer to religious employers 
over the extent to which employees must adhere to church teachings in both their 
public and, to the extent that it is observable, private lives.  A case from 
California offers a good application of this principle.  In declaring that “[a] 
teacher’s employment in the public schools is a privilege, not a right,”79 the court 
reiterated the principle that being an educator is not just another job.  The 
position of the Roman Catholic Church, for example, is explicit in this regard 
with canon law dictating that “teachers are to be outstanding in correct doctrine 
and integrity of life.”80  As such, the legal standard for educators in public 
schools is all the more applicable to teachers in religious schools since they must 
be exemplars or witnesses of the faith to their students (and others).  Specifying 
expectations clearly can avoid unnecessary and potentially expensive, not just 
 
 76. For a news report about the dismissal of Catholic school teacher due to her unwed 
pregnancy, see Josh Sweigert, Church: Unwed, Pregnant Teacher Fired for Violating ‘Morality 
Clause,’ DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/news/ 
church-unwed-pregnant-teacher-fired-for-violating-/nWZKj/.   
 77. For a case rejecting the Title VII claim of a divorced non-Catholic teacher from a Catholic 
school whose contract was non-renewed after she remarried because even though her husband was 
a non-practicing Catholic because she failed to pursue “the ‘proper canonical process available 
from the Roman Catholic Church to obtain validation of her second marriage,’” see Little v. Wuerl, 
929 F.2d 944, 945-46 (3d Cir. 1991) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 78. See JoAnne Viviano, Hot-Button Issue Ex-Teacher Won’t Get Job Back in Deal, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 16, 2013, at 1A, 2013 WLNR 20393260 (reporting that a nineteen-year 
teacher whose being gay came to light as a result of a statement in her mother’s obituary revealing 
that she had a same-sex partner would not be reinstated as part of a settlement with the diocese).   
 79. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Los Angeles v. Wilkinson, 270 P.2d 82, 85 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1954). 
 80. CODE OF CANON LAW Cannon 803, § 2 (1983). 
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financial cost but also to the emotional or working climate in schools, conflict 
that can tear educational communities apart. 
Fifth, an unstated assumption in the development of hiring policies is that 
educational leaders need to act on the advice of attorneys.  To this end, school 
officials should work closely with lawyers who are knowledgeable about civil 
law and the teachings of their faiths.  While retaining the services of attorneys 
with expertise in both of these areas may be expensive, the additional 
expenditure is likely to be dwarfed by the costs saved if employment 
disagreements result in litigation. 
Sixth, educational leaders should create hiring policies consistent with 
Biblical norms and Church teachings with regard to labor and employment 
issues.81  By doing so, officials should do more than simply follow the letter of 
the law, whether religious or civil, in developing policies.  In this way, school 
leaders should witness to church praxis while further legitimizing their authority 
in decision making over personnel. 
The final recommendation suggests that educational leaders regularly 
update personnel policies, typically on an annual basis.  These annual reviews 
should take place during summer breaks, at meetings separate from the regular 
school year.  That way, time will have passed between controversies that may 
have led to calls for changes and actually reworking the language and content of 
personnel policies.  Adopting a proactive approach should help in making 
changes in a thoughtful, reflective manner rather than in the “heat of the 
moment” that can lead to hasty and often less than well thought out changes. 
While keeping policies up-to-date by ensuring compliance with emerging legal 
developments cannot guarantee that either conflicts or litigation will not occur, 
they can help to demonstrate good faith to the courts that may grant officials the 
benefit of the doubt when disagreements arise. 
CONCLUSION 
To the extent that leaders in faith-based schools understand the different, 
yet complementary, roles between church teachings and Title VII, they are likely 
to retain the freedom to hire as they deem appropriate.  It is important, then, for 
educational leaders in faith-based schools to distinguish between religious and 
secular aspects of job duties to ensure enduring workplace peace and compliance 
with church teachings.  At the same time, educational leaders will be satisfying 
the needs of both the civil and religious juridical systems under which they 
operate their schools. 
 
 81. For a discussion of labor law and Catholic education, see David L. Gregory & Charles J. 
Russo, The First Amendment and Labor Relations of Religiously-Affiliated Employers, 8 B.U. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 449, 465-67 (1999). 
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